Section 1: Introduction
Rapid economic growth is perceived as a panacea for developing nations. Hence in the interest of increasing the pace of development, countries have begun to re-examine the way they do business. Governments in developing countries talk about reforming laws and removing roadblocks, in order to usher in a golden age of domestic and foreign investment. Reforms in various spheres including the financial sector, taxation, agriculture, industrial policy, pollution regulation, infrastructure, intellectual property rights, and labor laws are needed to enhance global competitiveness. A detailed study of this issue is important in order to get a clear view of the link between regulations and investments. In this research, we study the effect of labor conflict and formal labor laws on new investment in the various states of India. We find that labor disputes and pro-worker legislations inhibit location choice and new investments.
With the initiation of liberalization policies and economic reforms in India in 1991 1 , the role of private investment in economic growth has gained significant importance. States now compete with one another to attract new investment. In such inter-state competition, environmental and labor regulations are key. In the context of developed economies, there is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of regulations on a firm's location and investment decision. However, there is a paucity of research on this topic in the context of developing countries. One of the few exceptions is Besley and Burgess (2002) . They find that movements towards pro-worker policies were "associated with lower levels of investment, employment and output" for Indian manufacturing industries. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has considered how labor conditions in a state affect firm incentives at a micro level. By analyzing the impact of amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 (our 1 India started major economic reforms and nationwide liberalization in 1991 in response to a fiscal and balance of payments crisis. These reforms encompassed all major areas -industrial policy, trade and exchange rate policy, tax reforms, and public sector policies.
measure of formal labor legislation) and the influence of labor conflict on new investment, we address this gap in the literature.
Labor regulations encompass a wide variety of laws ranging from those formulated to ensure the health and safety of workers to those aimed at resolving industrial disputes. The former category includes policies on minimum wages, work hours, and health and safety standards for factories. The second broad category of labor laws is aimed at ensuring the rights of both workers and employers. These deal mainly with the rights of workers to unionize, collective bargaining processes, layoff policies, mechanisms to resolve disputes, and policies on strikes and lockouts. The focus of this analysis is how the latter set of factors affects the input costs of firms, and hence, the location of new projects across the states of India.
Our analysis of firm location choice provides striking results. We find that measures of labor conflict such as the state-wise number of lockouts, percentage of unionized workers, and the number of man-days lost in disputes resulting in work stoppages, all have strong negative impacts on new investment. Our results are robust to the inclusion of variables such as a Gini inequality measure and various other measures of input costs and state infrastructure. Results are also unaffected when we condition on institutional labor legislation and account for project characteristics. Finally, we estimate a more flexible specification that allows us to model the fact that certain industries are constrained by their need for proximity to sources of raw materials and minerals. We find that such considerations are particularly important for new projects in mining and agricultural industries.
The paper consists of six main sections. Section 1 introduces the topic of this research and section 2 provides a literature review. The third section gives an overview of the data, whereas the fourth section discusses our empirical methodology. Section 5 reports our results and the last section concludes. All tables and graphs are in the appendix of the paper.
Section 2: Literature Review
Section 2.1: Investment and Location Choice
We start by focusing on the body of literature on determinants of location decisions.
While none consider labor conflict per se, these studies provide useful insights into factors that may retard or encourage new investment. Most employ conditional logit models to study a firm's location choice. The explanatory variables include institutional and regulatory factors, economic parameters, and indicators of the existing industrial environment -all of which affect the firm's operating costs. In general, environmental regulations, wages, energy costs, property value, and unemployment, all have negative impacts on location probabilities; whereas population and better infrastructure have positive impacts (Wolverton 2002 , List and Co 2000 , Levinson 1996 , and McConnell and Schwab 1990 . Additionally, recent work (Keller and Levinson 2002) has found that pollution abatement costs have deterring effects on foreign direct investment across states of the U.S.
In terms of labor measures specifically, results are mixed. For example, the presence of unions increases the collective bargaining power of workers and raises wages -this factor should negatively affect location decisions. But evidence for the US ranges from a positive and significant relationship between the percentage of unionized workers and location choice probabilities (List and Co 2000) , to no relationship (McConnell and Schwab 1990) , to significant negative impacts of unionization (Bartik 1985) . However, differences in right-to-work laws across U.S. states are found to have strong effects, with more "pro-business" states attracting the lion's share of manufacturing activity (Holmes 1998 ).
In the case of developing countries, Kuncoro (2000) has found similar effects of wages and infrastructure on the location decisions of firms in Indonesia. For India, Mani, Pargal and Huq (1997) The Factories Act of 1948 and the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 are the two most important acts that govern working conditions in factories and provide a mechanism for the settlement of industrial disputes. The former seeks to set standards for safe working conditions; mandates working hours and vacation and overtime policy; and sets health and safety standards. This Act, along with the Equal Remuneration Act of 1976, the Minimum Wages Act, the Payment of Bonus Act, and the Maternity Benefits Act; constitute the backbone of the labor laws in India today. The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 and the Trade Unions Act seek to protect the worker from being exploited by the employer. The former provides guidelines for settling disputes, and also lays out conditions under which a worker may be laid off and the various ways of redressing the situation. The latter grants workers the right to unionize and outlines certain protections and privileges that union members would enjoy. Although these acts apply to all states in India, their efficacy depends on the political will of each state government.
power for the past twenty years. The pro-worker bias of the party may affect outcomes of collective bargaining, disputes, and strikes, even without any formal changes in labor policies at the level of the state government.
Although recent work has shown that stringent pro-worker regulations have negative impacts on the economic performance of states in India (Aghion, Burgess and Redding 2002 , Besley and Burgess 2002 , and Bajpai and Sachs 2000 , no study has considered how labor conflict at the state level influences the location decisions of new projects in India. By analyzing this question using a fixed effects conditional logit methodology, this paper contributes to the research on the economics of firm geography in developing countries.
Section 3: Data
The data used in this study are from two primary sources -Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) and Indiastat. The CMIE data set tracks every major 4 new investment made in India from July 1995, and has information on the location of new projects, their start date, as well as other project characteristics such as status (proposed, under implementation, completed) , ownership (private Indian, private foreign, state govt., central govt., joint sector, cooperative sector), type (new unit, substantial expansion, renovation/modernization, rehabilitation) and industrial classification.
Our study focuses on the 1997-1999 time period. The estimation sample in our research comprises of only private domestic projects that are either under implementation or have been completed. We exclude projects in the service and irrigation sectors, and include those in manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and electricity, gas, and water sectors (see tables 1(d), 1(e), and 1(f)). Our sample thus consists of 637 projects over our time span of interest. In our data, Important among these are input costs, since wages and power tariffs compose a large part of the daily operating costs of most projects. Wages are measured by the average 12 daily wage rate for urban unskilled workers lagged by 3 years. In India, power rates vary by the size of the industry and also by the usage -the so-called declining block tariff. We use the average tariff for medium and large industries (lagged by 1 year) for estimation purposes. The choice is dictated by the observation that most projects in our sample fall under these two industrial categories, when classified in terms of power consumption 13 .
Other economic explanatory variables include growth rate of industrial gross state product (GSP), an urban Gini coefficient (lagged by 1 year), and EXIM (Export-Import) bank funding. We believe that for India, the growth rate of industrial GSP serves more as an indicator of the overall health of the state, rather than as a gauge of market size. For most products, firms consider their market to be the all-India market. The urban Gini coefficient (for per capita consumption expenditure) measures income inequality in the state. Investors may choose to move to states with a low inequality index since this may signal a better overall "economic"
climate.
Location decisions may also be influenced by the availability of skilled labor and the level of infrastructure in a state. Thus, we include measures of state literacy, urban workforce participation rates (lagged by 1 year), and road length (lagged by 1 year) in our estimations.
Literacy measures are important because they proxy for labor efficiency and productivity. The workforce participation variable is an indicator of the size of the labor force. This variable should affect location choice probabilities positively, as labor availability eases pressure on wages and thus decreases input costs. The next section discusses our methodology and provides intuition for the models we use.
Section 4: Empirical Strategy
We begin by obtaining a preliminary understanding of the relationship between new investments and labor conflict. In order to do this, we estimate two sets of panel data models.
13 Our main results remain unchanged when we alternatively control for the tariff rates of small and large industries in our specifications.
The first set evaluates the determinants of the total number of new projects in a state, where one of the determinants is a measure of labor disputes. The second set considers determinants of the total value of new investments within a state; again, one of the determinants is a measure of labor disputes. State-fixed effects are present in both sets of panel data models to control for other state-level factors that may influence the dependent variable, but on which we have no information. These omitted variables may lead to spurious correlations between our labor disputes measure and the error term; that is, our labor disputes variable may be endogenous. In the absence of a correction, this endogeneity would bias our results. The use of state-fixed effects helps us control for the influence of other state-level time-invariant factors absent from our specification. State-fixed effects thus correct for the endogeneity of our labor disputes variables which arises due to missing data. Moreover, states of India differ dramatically in terms of resource availability, cultural heritage, population characteristics, and infrastructure. Our use of fixed effects helps us account for state-level differences that do not vary over time. Hence, we estimate two sets of state-fixed effects models in our preliminary investigation of the relationship between new investment and labor conflict. The first set utilizes state-fixed effects negative binomial (count) models (with robust standard errors); the second set estimates linear state-fixed effects models. These results are presented in table 2.
After our preliminary study, we analyze project location decisions in greater detail. We employ conditional logit models in order to accomplish this. The intuition behind our use of the conditional logit model is as follows. We hypothesize that a firm makes a single decision (the state in which the project should be located) among several alternatives (the sixteen locations noted in table 1(c)). In making this decision, firms consider the attributes of each location. They then formulate implicit equations that correspond to each of the sixteen locations. Each of these location-specific equations measures the net profit of situating the project in that location. Firms choose to situate the project in the location (state) where the net profit is the largest. Following
McFadden (1973), we arrive at the conditional logit model by making two assumptions regarding the error terms of the implicit profit equations 14 . Most other studies on location choice have also used conditional logit specifications. Our use of this category of models is thus in keeping with the literature.
As detailed above, we use a conditional logit framework to study project location decisions. The conditioning is at the project level as each project in our data is given the choice of locating in one of sixteen states. We hypothesize that one major factor that determines project location is the incidence of labor disputes in a state. As noted above, unobservables (and statelevel heterogeneity) may lead to the endogeneity of this labor disputes variable. We control for this by using state-fixed effects. Thus, we study project location decisions in a state-fixed effects conditional logit framework using data from 1998-1999. Since there may be multiple projects located in a state, the standard errors of our point estimates are adjusted for clustering at the state level. These results are reported in tables 3(a) -5.
The next section reports and discusses the results of our various specifications.
Section 5: Results
Section 5.1: Preliminary Analysis
As noted above, in order to obtain a preliminary sense of the relation between new investment and state-level labor regulations, we estimate two sets of panel data models for 1994 -1999. Results are as reported in table 2. The first two columns depict estimates for fixed 14 As noted in Greene (2003) , these assumptions are that the error terms are independent and identically distributed, and that they follow the type I extreme value (Gumbel) distribution.
effects negative binomial (count) models. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the total number of new projects in a state. Columns (3) and (4) report results for linear fixed effects models, where the dependent variable is the value of total new investment in a state. As is clear from columns (1) - (4), (normalized) number of lockouts has a strong negative effect on new projects and new investment within states. Hence, there is preliminary evidence that labor conflict has deterring effects on new investment.
From column (1) of table 2 we observe that the growth rate of income in a state has a positive and significant effect on the total number of new projects. The male wage variable has expected effects but contrary to intuition, a rise in female wages increases the number of new projects. This may be partly explained by the fact that wages proxy for workforce efficiency and equality. Column (2) is a parsimonious form of the model in column (1). As is clear, expected results obtain.
In the linear fixed effects model of column (3), we find that credit availability and the growth rate are not significant factors in explaining the magnitude of new investment in a state.
Column (4) is a parsimonious form of the linear fixed effects model with variables that correspond to those in column (2). Again, expected results obtain. In summary, results of table 2 confirm our hypothesis that labor conflict has negative effects on new investments. Next, we investigate the firm's location decision at the micro-level. as an urban Gini coefficient, and other variables that include measures of credit availability in the state. These variables are believed to affect the net profits of projects, and will thus influence location decisions. Our use of the conditional logit model presumes that a project is sited in the state where net profits are the highest. The total number of projects over the 1998-1999 time period is 437, and, as noted above, the total number of location choices is sixteen. We include both state and year specific, as well as project specific variables in our estimations.
The conditional logit is modeled on the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This assumption does not allow for correlation across the unobservables of the sixteen net profit equations. This assumption is clearly a strong one to make, since profits may be correlated across states and regions. The conventional technique to relax the IIA assumption is to introduce regional dummies (see Bartik 1985) . However, since regional dummies do not vary over years, they are not identified in our state-fixed effects framework. We account for correlations in location decisions by introducing dummies and their interactions in our framework.
Before discussing our results, we note that the conditional logit estimations are likely to be affected by two main sets of selection issues. First, our data consists of only those projects that were located in the various states of India. If labor conflict deters new investment, a large set of projects may not have been undertaken. Thus we have a non-randomly selected sample and our estimates may reflect sample selection bias. However, this is a conservative bias since our estimates do not capture the negative impact of labor conflict on those projects that were 16 The choice of the sample period is dictated by data availability. The majority of the variables of interest were available for mainly these two years.
never implemented. Our results thus underestimate the overall deterring effects of labor problems; eliminating the bias should only strengthen the results of our study.
Second, our estimates may be affected by bias resulting from selection on unobservables.
Consider two scenarios. First, a firm that has extensive previous experience dealing with labor conflict issues decides the location of a project. The firm may locate the project in a state with relatively more labor problems solely because it is confident of being able to handle future conflicts, given its past experience. We can think of this firm (or project) as being more "able"
to cope with labor problems. Since we do not have data on firm's past experience, this variable is unobserved from our perspective. However, the lack of such data may not be too problematic.
This is because such unobserved variables lead to an underestimation of the true negative impact of labor conflict. If we included information on firm's past experience in dealing with labor issues (that is, if we had this information), our results should become stronger.
Alternatively, consider a scenario in which a state has a pro-worker reputation. That is, regardless of the true nature of labor laws, the local government has traditionally favored the worker in labor disputes. Firms may shy away from locating projects in such states even if labor problems are relatively infrequent. Since we do not have information on the "local enforcement history" of states, the results of this study may overestimate the negative impact of labor conflict.
However, our use of state-fixed effects controls for the influence of all such unobservables that are state-specific and time invariant. Hence, lack of data on state-specific information that is constant over time should not bias the results of this research. We acknowledge that overestimation of labor conflict's negative effect may still be an issue in the case of unobservables that are not state-specific and time-invariant. Given paucity of data for correcting this in the present study, we hope to account for such concerns in future work. To get a better idea of the magnitude of the effects of the variables in the basic model of table 3(a), we calculate own-and cross-elasticities 17 . The elasticities enable us to judge to what extent and by how much each of these variables affects location choice probabilities. The interpretation of own-and cross-elasticities is similar to the interpretation of elasticities in the standard price-elasticity framework. Own-elasticity measures the "responsiveness of an individual's choice probability to a change in the value of some attribute" (Ben-Akiva and 17 To calculate the own-and cross-elasticities, we proceed in the following manner. We first calculate individual elasticities and then calculate their weighted average using choice probabilities as weights. Suppose there are "i" locations to choose from, "n" projects that are choosing between these locations, and "k" regressors or attributes.
Then disaggregate own elasticity is given by:
where P n (i) is the probability of a particular project "n" choosing location "i", x ink is the attribute of interest 17 , and β k is the coefficient on attribute k from the conditional logit model. Therefore, aggregate own-elasticity is given by:
Aggregate cross-elasticity can be calculated in an analogous manner. Lerman 1985) . Similarly, cross-elasticity shows the responsiveness of an individual's probability of choosing location i when the value of some attribute changes in location j.
Column (2) of table 3(a) reports results for own-elasticities, whereas column (3) of table 3(a) reports results for cross-elasticities. The calculations show that for a 1% increase in the normalized number of lockouts within a state, the probability that a project will be located in that state decreases by approximately 0.0033%. The signs and magnitudes of the cross-elasticities are also as expected. For example, for a 1% increase in the normalized number of lockouts in other states, the probability that a project will be located in this state increases by approximately 0.0015%. Although these magnitudes are relatively small, the elasticities confirm that states that are perceived to have a pro-worker tilt will attract fewer projects.
Section 5.3.2: Economic Variables and Input Cost Results
In terms of the effects of other variables in table 3(a), the urban Gini coefficient (for per capita consumption expenditure) has a significant negative impact in column (1). A negative coefficient implies that firms prefer locating in areas with low inequality. This could be attributed to the fact that such areas may experience less labor unrest. Credit availability, as captured by the EXIM bank disbursement variable, is positive and significant. This implies that capital market considerations play an important role in a project's location decision. The average daily wage of unskilled laborers is seen to have a negative effect, whereas power tariffs have little effect on location choice. The workforce participation rate, state literacy measures, and the state's industrial growth rate are all measured imprecisely in table 3(a).
The road length variable (normalized by the area of the state) has a significant negative coefficient in table 3(a). This sign is unexpected as road length serves as a measure of state infrastructure. Greater availability of surfaced roads lowers the cost of transportation, which should increase the probability that a project will be located in that area. However, states with better infrastructure may have higher real estate costs. Such costs may lower location choice probabilities (we have no information on real estate costs in areas where projects locate to test this explicitly).
The fixed effects of table 3(a) are also of interest. These variables capture state-specific unobservables which may influence location choice. From table 3(a) we observe that compared to Andhra Pradesh (base case), firm have a higher probability of locating in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Delhi. Projects are relatively less likely to locate in Rajasthan and the 'Other' states category.
Section 5.4: Sensitivity to Formal Labor Regulation
The labor variables discussed as of now capture the on-the-ground impact of labor legislations. But formal labor laws and amendments may also be important determinants of location choice. We introduce these to test for the robustness of our labor conflict variables, and also to account for an alternative source of disincentives in choice of locations. As noted above, our information on specific categories of labor legislations is obtained from Besley and Burgess (2002) .
We use the share of pro-worker amendments passed by a state, and dummies related to severance pay and the right to strike to capture the anti-employer stance of states (table 3(c)).
Column (1) of this table shows that as hypothesized, the coefficient on the share of pro-worker amendments is negative and significant at the 1% level. In column (2), the severance pay dummy is negative and significant. This implies that states with provisions for severance pay will attract fewer projects. This is because such provisions raise labor costs, and introduce inflexibilities in hiring and firing workers. The coefficient on the right to strike dummy insignificant. This may be due to collinearity between this dummy and the lockout variable -it is likely that states with a right to strike provision will have higher numbers of strikes and lockouts.
Other explanatory variables in both specifications have the same effects as before. In general, results suggest that with controls for input costs, economic conditions, and state unobservables, pro-worker states are less likely to attract new investment. In table 4, we investigate the impact of project characteristics on location choice probabilities. We introduce two characteristics -a non-technology dummy and a project type dummy. The non-technology dummy takes a value of one if the project belongs to a "non-hightech" industrial classification ("high-tech" industrial classifications include chemicals, electrical machinery, electronics-computers and software, non-electrical machinery and transport machinery). Thus in column (1) of table 4, all projects are classified as either non-high-tech or high-tech based on a non-technology dummy. We hypothesize that high-tech projects will be attracted to states that spend relatively more on research and development (R&D). In order to test this, we interact the non-technology dummy with a variable that measures state expenditures on R&D. If high-tech projects are more likely to locate in states that spend on R&D, we expect the interaction term to be insignificant. The first column of table 4 confirms that this is the case.
Controlling for other variables that influence location choice, R&D expenditure has positive effects on the location probabilities of high-tech projects only. As evident from the interaction term and p-value in column (1) (2) confirm that this is the case; percent growth rate of industrial GSP has strong positive effects on location probabilities of new projects only. As evident from the interaction term and p-value in column (2) of table 4, the growth rate has little predictive power for projects that are not classified as new units or new articles. Section 5.5.2: Analysis by Industrial Classification An important consideration is the effect of resource constraints on project siting decisions. For example, projects related to mining or agriculture may not have a large degree of freedom in deciding choice of location, since such projects need to be situated close to sources of raw materials. Hence no matter how strong labor unrest is in a state, if that state happens to be a source of important raw materials and minerals, we would expect to see positive location choice probabilities for mining projects in that state (relative to the base case). To account for such considerations, location-specific constants are interacted with two industry dummies -these dummies capture effects specific to (a) mining and agriculture and (b) manufacturing. Table 5 reports the results of this analysis.
From the first column of table 5 we observe that despite the negative effects of the labor conflict variables, the interaction of the mining and agriculture dummy with a state dummy is significant and positive in most cases. Consider the interaction term for Orissa. The positive coefficient implies that compared to Andhra Pradesh, mining and agricultural projects have a higher probability of locating in Orissa. This is as expected since Orissa has large mineral reserves. Alternatively, from the second column of table 5 we see that manufacturing projects have an especially high probability of locating in Punjab and Delhi (as compared to Andhra Pradesh). This is also as expected since these states lie in the "manufacturing belt" region of India.
As noted before, in both specifications of table 5, the labor conflict variable continues to exert a negative effect on location choice. Credit availability has a positive impact, whereas the Gini inequality measure has a negative impact (this is measured imprecisely in the second column of We recognize that these results are conditional in nature -the question that we consider is the particular location of a project, given that a project is going to exist. As noted above, there may be unconditional effects as well since restrictive laws could deter new projects. It is also possible that a firm which is planning to locate multiple projects will react differently to labor unrest as compared to a firm which is planning to locate a single project. Given data constraints,
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